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Introduction
During World War II, Jewish Canadians enlisted in the Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) in substantially higher numbers 
than their proportion of the national population. In contrast, 
Jewish enlistment in the Army (especially its combat units) 
and in the Navy was below national levels. Why did young 
Jewish men demonstrate a clear preference for the RCAF? 
How well disposed was the Air Force to receiving and deploy-
ing its Jewish volunteers? How did those volunteers fare in the 
RCAF, and did they encounter any barriers to achievement and 
advancement? What accounts for the remarkable preponderance 
of Jews as navigators (and under-representation as pilots) in 
bomber crews? 
 At the mid-point of the Second World War, 45% of Jews 
in Canada’s armed forces were in the RCAF.1 By war’s end, 
almost 60 % of Canada’s Jewish war dead had met their fate in 
Air Force uniform, a much higher proportion than the national 
average.2 Of the seventeen men listed in the honour roll of 
Montreal’s leading Conservative synagogue, all but one died 
in the service of the RCAF.3 Of the nearly five hundred Ottawa 
Jews who served, half were in the RCAF.4
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Jewish preference for the rCAf 
What accounts for this apparent preference among young 
Jewish men for Air Force service? It would be difficult to know 
the motives of those who enlisted over seventy years ago, but 
some inducements can be identified. For those who voluntarily 
enlisted and wanted to get into action, the Air Force provided 
the most immediate opportunity to do so in the early years of 
the conflict. By the late spring of 1940, Allied armies in Europe 
were in retreat or defeat, and there was no prospect of ground 
invasion for years to come. The Royal Canadian Navy had not 
yet begun its expansion. Air power was the only means of carry-
ing the fight to German territory. Flying held tremendous appeal 
for young men at that time, but was out of reach for most, even 
as a passenger let alone as a pilot. Air Force service offered the 
opportunity to fly, and had a reputation for relying more on dash 
than on drill, in contrast to infantry service. Under the British 
Commonwealth Air Training Program (BCATP), aircrew would 
graduate at least as sergeants (i.e. non-commissioned officers 
or NCOs), and most would learn a valuable technical trade.5 
As well, the horror and futility of trench warfare, experienced 
only a generation before, had not been forgotten. Better to die 
in the air than to come home maimed from army service. These 
considerations would have appealed to a broad range of young 
Canadian men, but some perhaps had a particular appeal to 
Jewish Canadians.
 As Richard Overy observed, in explaining the Allied 
victory over the Axis:
The application of technological strength through 
air power compensated for the difficulties in 
turning civilians with little experience of mili-
tary life into effective soldiers. Western forces 
preferred the bomb to the bayonet.6
Turning citizens into servicemen was not an insignificant 
challenge for democratic countries that did not rely on martial 
values and a militaristic culture. Jewish citizens, in particular, 
were not renowned for their traditions of military service, their 
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familiarity with firearms and the weapons of war, or their enthu-
siasm for hand to hand combat. Bombing from the air distanced 
the infliction of death and destruction on the ground. Evading 
death in the air put a premium on skill and dexterity over physi-
cal size and strength.
 Some early entries in the war diary of Percy Jacobson, 
from Montreal, about his son’s prospective enlistment, illustrate 
these concerns:7
For several days now, in fact ever since the war, 
I have had Joe on my mind…I know that he 
can’t keep out of it. First of all we are Jews and 
Hitler’s persecution of the Jews will go down 
into history along with the stories of the Spanish 
Inquisition. Second of all even if he felt war was 
wrong and realized the wickedness of destroy-
ing the youth of the world he couldn’t stand by 
and see his friends fight for him. And third as 
a graduate of McGill with a fine record in the 
classroom and on the field, he would lose caste 
in his own eyes as well as with his fellow men. 
(13 September 1939)
I am hoping that my son will keep out of the 
war until we in Canada know just what we are 
expected to do. So far nobody seems to know. 
(17 September 1939) 
God grant that he may be allowed to be of more 
use to this Canada of ours than holding a rifle. 
That he may be called upon to do something 
better for his Alma Mater than stick some poor 
devil in the belly with a bayonet. (18 September 
1939)
For Percy Jacobson, his son’s military service was both 
inevitable and necessary. Yet he wanted him to exercise caution 
about how and when to enlist. If his son had to fight, he wanted 
him to contribute effectively and to the best of his abilities, and 
minimize the risk of brutal and senseless death.8
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Jewish acceptance in the rCAf
Jews being so well represented in the RCAF seemed an improb-
able outcome to at least some in the Jewish community in 
the first months of the war. Jews were at that time barred 
from housing and public accommodation in some districts, 
limited by quotas in some universities and professions, and 
unwelcome in most corporations and clubs. Suspicions that 
similar discrimination might be encountered in the military, and 
especially in the elite air and naval services, were inevitable. 
Percy Jacobson commented on his son’s prospects for enlist-
ment in his diary:9
Jews are not wanted in the air force and certain 
regiments. (18 September, 1939)
I am not sure whether the Navy takes Jews. (4 
October, 1939)
It seems to be as hard to get into the Canadian 
Air Force as a snooty club. (7 June, 1940)
Yet these suspicions, however plausible, were grounded 
neither in existing air force regulations nor in the new circum-
stances of 1940. By June of that year, Canada’s newly established 
Air Training Program needed all the qualified candidates it 
could obtain, and then some. An air force that had graduated 
no more than fifty pilots a year was now committed to turning 
out over a thousand trained airmen every month. In the face 
of a new and desperate situation, old ways of doing things, 
along with existing attitudes and prejudices, would need to 
give way. 
But what were these existing attitudes and prejudices, 
and how did they affect the recruitment of Jews, if at all? In fact, 
it was Canadians of non-European background who were explic-
itly excluded from air force recruiting and from commissions.10 
Although the Cabinet War Committee stated in December 1941 
that no rank or service should be closed to any Canadian simply 
because of race or colour, it simultaneously drew attention to 
practical difficulties in mixing races, and added that “Neither 
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fighting efficiency nor civilian morale should be sacrificed to 
the principle of racial equality.”11 These recruiting restrictions 
were only gradually lifted, mainly from 1942 onwards.12 
The only explicit RCAF recruiting exclusions based on 
“undesirable racial background” regarding persons of European 
origin in the summer of 1940 applied to Germans and Italians.13 
There were no mandated barriers to Jewish enlistment, and Jews 
could and did enroll in Canadian Officer Training Corps units 
from the beginning.
There were effectively three considerations that affected 
Canada’s armed services recruitment policies in 1940: morale, 
loyalty, and fighting qualities. The first applied mainly to non-
whites, based on the concern that Canadians of European origin 
might be unwilling to serve alongside them in combat units. 
The second applied to Germans, Italians, and (later) Japanese 
Canadians. Only the third had any significant effect on Jews, 
perhaps more tangentially than directly, and with respect to 
advancement within rather than recruitment to the services, as 
will be explored further below.
 Where old attitudes and prejudices did come into play 
was the self-congratulatory view (widespread in Britain’s Royal 
Air Force and, not coincidently, to some degree in the RCAF), 
that courage and fighting grit, as well as flying abilities, were 
the preserve of the white race and in particular the peoples of 
the British Isles.14 There remained, in senior British ranks, a 
view that the military virtues of steadfastness and calm in the 
face of danger, initiative, and athleticism were most likely to 
be found in the public schools, and especially among the sons 
of the landed gentry. These virtues were seen as the product of 
breeding and background, a matter of class as well as of race. 
Intellect or specific skills, in this view, counted for rather less. 
It followed that Jews, as well as other non-British peoples, were 
less likely to have these virtues.
 Yet, some factors worked to the advantage of Jews 
seeking to enlist in the RCAF, not least that (at the outset) a 
minimum of junior matriculation was required for entry. Of all 
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the service branches, the Air Force was the most technically and 
scientifically advanced. Its air crews required men of the highest 
mental skills and physical dexterity. While the junior matricula-
tion requirement likely constituted an effective barrier for some 
other elements of the Canadian population otherwise eligible 
for recruitment (not least French-Canadians and Aboriginals), 
it provided if anything an advantage for Jews, a relatively high 
proportion of whom could meet the academic requirement.15 
Canadian youth who had the connections or the education were 
better positioned to join their preferred branch of service, and to 
advance in it by obtaining a commission. What Jews might have 
lacked by way of connections, they made up for by their educa-
tion. Thus, the disproportionate numbers of Jewish Canadians 
in Air Force service was likely due to a combination of the 
inducements offered by service in the RCAF, the lack of any 
mandated barriers to entry, and ability of many Jews to meet the 
entrance requirements.
 Nonetheless, the RCAF was at the outset of the war 
overwhelmingly English-speaking and Protestant. Of a sample 
of fifty men who entered the RCAF in the summer of 1940,16 
forty-one were Protestant, five Catholic, three Jewish, and one 
Syrian Orthodox. Most of the fifty had Canadian-born parents. 
Of the non-Canadian born parents, almost all had emigrated 
from Britain. Only six had come from Europe (Russia, Poland, 
Romania, Ukraine), and two from present-day Lebanon. 
Practically all came from middle-class backgrounds, and their 
work experience was generally white collar. If this sample was 
representative, it was the logical outcome of the ethnic makeup 
and socio-economic status of the Canadian population, differing 
willingness to enlist among the various sectors of the popula-
tion, and existing recruitment biases.
Assessment by the rCAf
Just because there were no formal barriers to Jewish enlistment 
in the RCAF does not mean that the force was blind to religious 
or ethnic background. As in civilian life, Jews were subject to 
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critical judgment in a way that their Protestant or Catholic fellow 
citizens were not. In the context of military service those judg-
ments focused, as already noted, on character traits ascribed to 
Jews, in negative contrast to those allegedly inherent in persons 
of Anglo-Saxon background. If Jews were thought not to possess 
the sturdiness of body and tenacity of will to prevail on the play-
ing field and on the frontier, could they endure the suffering and 
hardship of battle, remain steadfast and stoic in adversity, and 
so lead and inspire other men in war? These did not seem to 
be inappropriate questions in 1940, even to those not otherwise 
motivated by prejudice, although there were sometimes inappro-
priate or unsupportable answers. Nor were these questions absent 
from the minds of military leaders in Canada or Britain as the 
war got underway. Such doubts were sometimes expressed by 
both commanders and enlisted men about all those of non-British 
stock, but most especially about Jews. There may well have been 
senior RCAF officers who were less than enthusiastic about 
Jewish recruits at the beginning of the war.17 
 Existing attitudes within the RCAF may be discerned 
especially from the initial assessments of Jewish volunteers. 
These assessments are recorded chiefly in the interview report 
upon enlistment, and the recheck medical exam at the end of 
the first month at Initial Training School. Neither document 
required specification of religion or ethnicity, however the iden-
tification of a recruit as “Jewish” or “Hebrew” is often found in 
the overall character assessment. Here is a range of comments 
about Jewish recruits found in a sample of those documents.18 
Hebrew, quite pleasant, self assured, ambitious, 
good physique, will be rather pushing. Polite, 
rather rough due to background. (interview 
report, 4 April 1940)
Hebrew descent but good type. (interview report, 
22 April 1940) 
One of the best Jewish lads I have ever met. 
(interview report, 13 May 1940)
Very good type – should make good air gunner. 
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Hebrew – but not noticeable. (interview report, 
17 June 1940)
Jewish – rather dark featured. Appears to be 
made of good stuff. Recommend that he be given 
his choice as pilot. (#1 Initial Training School 
report, July 1940)
Rather stable Hebrew. (medical board report, 27 
July 1940)
Athletic and educational qualification good. 
Rather off hand and sure of himself. These plus 
racial characteristics may be a factor in his rela-
tion with associates. Good average – doubtful of 
his ability to handle men. (medical board report, 
7 August 1940)
A very good Jewish Canadian type. (interview 
report, 14 November 1940
Good type of Hebrew. (medical board report, 22 
November 1940)
Jewish lad of good type. (medical board report, 
14 June 1941)
These comments (which I have ordered chronologically) 
range from mere observation, to discernment of good character 
despite being Jewish, to confirmation of “undesirable” Jewish 
characteristics that could be corrected, or if not could be limit-
ing. Pupil reports, which came later in the training process, 
almost never contain outright notations of Jewishness, although 
some contain what might be seen as coded comments about 
Jewish characteristics, such as:
A loud type. Always wisecracking. Not particu-
larly popular…(pupil air observer report, 26 
April 1941)
Noisy, talkative type. (pupil air observer report, 
20 February 1942)
Odd if not positively offensive as these assessments 
would be regarded today, at that time Jewish identity was 
commonly noted if not also remarked on in civilian life, and so 
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it appears to have been in the RCAF. Taken in isolation, these 
comments might be seen as confirmation of anti-semitism in 
the military. Against this, however, is the fact that such nota-
tions, and especially adverse ones, were the exception not the 
rule. Good, bad or indifferent, they appear in less than a quarter 
of the files reviewed. Most were recorded in the first wave of 
air force recruitment, and appear to be less frequent over time. 
Consideration should be given as well to the numerous recollec-
tions of Jewish servicemen of the camaraderie, tolerance, and 
the absence of discrimination in the military.19
 Overall, the largely subjective and sometimes gratuitous 
preliminary assessments (made by interviewers and medical 
board chairs who were commonly veterans of the previous 
war), range from highly laudatory to dourly uncomplimentary, 
in proportions seemingly no different from their assessments of 
gentile recruits.20 During the course of recruitment and training, 
it was not at all uncommon for the same individual to receive 
markedly different assessments along the way about his charac-
ter, work habits, aptitude, and potential. 
Trade Selection and Advancement
How significant were these initial assessments, and what 
consequences did they have for the new recruits? Leaving 
casual derogatory remarks aside (which all Jewish servicemen 
must have encountered from time to time, whether from their 
commanders, their examiners, or their fellow airmen), if Jewish 
servicemen did encounter particular stereotypes or prejudices, 
how did these affect their careers? Did they act as barriers to 
their achievement and advancement in the RCAF? If so, can this 
be measured by quantitative indicators rather than anecdotes?
 To try to answer these questions, I tabulated the basic 
demographic characteristics and military status of the approxi-
mately two hundred and forty-five Jews who died in RCAF 
uniform between 1940 and 1945.21 Four measures offer them-
selves for consideration: promotions, aircrew trade selection, 
commissions, and decorations. I consider the first only briefly, as 
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promotions were essentially routine within non-commissioned 
ranks. Upon completion of the air training program in Canada, 
the graduate received his badge, his wings, and promotion to 
sergeant rank. Promotion to flight sergeant almost invariably 
occurred within a year of graduation. Very few Jewish flying 
crew were still sergeants at time of death, mainly those who 
did not survive long enough to be promoted. The great majority 
of Jews who died as non-commissioned officers (NCOs) had 
already become flight sergeants or warrant officers.
 I therefore focus on trade selection and commissions, 
and conclude with a brief consideration of decorations. Although 
in the BCATP a recruit was selected for a specific trade long 
before being formally considered for a commission, the two 
indicators are inter-related and each requires some explanation. 
 By 1940, the RAF’s forecast requirements were 
mainly for the strategic air offensive against Germany, and the 
campaigns against enemy shipping and U-boats at sea. These 
were conducted by Bomber Command and Coastal Command 
respectively. The purpose of the Air Training Program was 
to provide recruits with the skill sets necessary to operate the 
aircraft used for those purposes, which were in both cases 
bombers (or fighter-bombers) that required pilots, air observers 
(responsible for both navigation and bomb-aiming), wireless 
operators, and air gunners. Pilots and observers were the hands 
and head of the aircraft, wireless operators and air gunners were 
its ears and eyes. The primary function of the initial training 
schools, where one’s flying career began, was to stream recruits 
into one of three trades – pilot, air observer, or wireless opera-
tor/air gunner (WO/AG) – in the proportions that complete air 
crews required.22 
 As already noted, in British military tradition, a man 
was nominally commissioned on the basis of his leadership 
capabilities. Character rather than intellect or specific skills was 
what counted. The key elements of an officer’s character were 
considered to be courage (not least, steadfastness and calm in 
the face of danger), initiative, and athleticism. An officer was 
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traditionally also a gentleman, and the mystique of class was 
thought to inspire the men under his command.23 These quali-
ties, along with a measure of daring and recklessness, were also 
required of pilots, who in the early days of military aviation 
were invariably commissioned officers. 
 The BCATP, however, was not intended to be a training 
ground for officers. Trade selection at initial training schools 
had above all to determine the aptitude of the new recruit for 
each trade, as well as his ability to complete his training within 
the approximately eight months provided for. Suitability for 
commissioning was a secondary consideration, and in fact many 
operational air crews in the early years of the war consisted 
largely or entirely of NCOs. Under the exigencies of a modern 
air war, old school methods of selection for character and lead-
ership were being replaced by nominally scientific methods of 
physical and psychological aptitude testing. Leadership, cour-
age, and character were still important, but even more so was 
competence.24 
 The appropriate balance between leadership and compe-
tence as the basis for aircrew commissions was the subject of 
competing viewpoints. Aptitude for a particular trade, and even 
success in it, did not predict courage and competence in the face 
of danger. Achievement in ground school and air exercises did 
not necessarily provide adequate grounding in military prac-
tice and leadership beyond the confines of the aircraft itself. 
Although pilots would automatically be the captains of the 
aircraft they flew, their training in Canada emphasized flying 
skills, not leadership skills. The basis for commissioning flying 
crew would be the subject of debate all through the war, within 
and between senior personnel in the RCAF and the RAF, and in 
their respective Air Ministries.25 
 These two indicators – trade selection and commis-
sioning – were not independent of each other. Under the 
BCATP, the first opportunity for appointment to commis-
sioned rank was upon completion of training. Eligibility was 
based on course standing, determined largely by demonstrated 
104    Peter J. Usher
proficiency in the air and on the ground. Less than 20% of the 
total mark was based on subjective assessments of suitability 
for commissioning. But the proportion of each class that was 
actually commissioned varied by trade. The top third of each 
pilot and air observer course was commissioned immediately 
upon graduation. The next tranche of graduates down to the 
mid-point of the class would be eligible for early commission 
based on individual performance in operations. The bottom half 
of each class was not disqualified from receiving commissions, 
but they might have to wait a long time. However, only the top 
10 % of wireless operators and air gunners were eligible for 
immediate commission. 
 Thus, all those early assessments of suitability for 
commissioning found in interview reports and medical boards 
counted for little by the time of graduation. What did count was 
that the senior air force ranks considered pilots and air observers 
to be the core of the bomber crew and that operational success 
would depend above all upon their skills, which is why they 
were commissioned in much higher proportion than wireless 
operators and air gunners. The trade for which a recruit was 
selected in Initial Training School strongly determined his 
subsequent flying career, not least his prospects for commis-
sioning and decoration.
 How then did Jews fare in their first few weeks at 
Initial Training School, with respect to trade selection? Figure 
1 compares the overall percentage of recruits selected as pilots, 
air observers, and WO/AGs during the course of the BCATP, 
with the percentage of Jews selected for these trades. The first 
set of columns shows BCATP output for each trade, expressed 
as percent of total, as of mid-1942. Considering that the medium 
bomber aircraft of 1940 required a crew of four to six men, 
normally a pilot and second pilot, an air observer, one or two 
WO/AGs, and an air gunner, it follows that the highest demand 
was for pilots, the lowest was for air observers. In fact, during 
its first two years, 51% of the BCATP’s graduates were pilots, 
17 % were air observers, and 32% were WO/AGs or AGs. The 
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final totals as of 1945 (the middle set of columns) were 36, 28, 
and 36% respectively, which reflected the changing air crew 
requirements of the newer heavy bombers.26
The third set of columns, however, shows that among 
Jewish air crew, nearly half were air observers, and only one 
quarter were pilots. As those figures are only for persons killed 
while flying, might they be unrepresentative in relation to total 
trade selection? As each crew member had a virtually equal 
chance of being killed in an operational loss or flying accident, it 
is reasonable to assume that the numbers do in fact represent the 
overall distribution of Jews in bomber crew trades. There were, 
of course, Jews who were selected for pilot training who washed 
out before completion. In the early years the overall failure rate 
in elementary flying training was about 20%, but there is no 
reason to believe that Jews were less successful in flying train-
ing than anyone else. Most of those who washed out of flying 
training (almost all of whom were gentiles) were re-mustered as 
air observers, so this cannot account for the observed difference. 
The reality is that Jews were much less likely to be selected for 
flying training in the first place. Moreover, this pattern does not 
appear to have changed much over the course of the war.
 These data are sufficiently striking to call for an expla-
nation. But first we need to understand the critical differences 
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
Canadians	  trained	  April	  1940	  -­‐	  June	  
1942	  
Canadians	  trained	  April	  1940	  -­‐	  March	  
1945	  
Jewish	  CasualIes	  1940-­‐45	  
Percent	  
Figure	  1:	  WW	  II	  RCAF	  Aircrew	  	  Selec6on	  by	  Trade	  	  
Pilot	   Air	  Observer	   Wireless/Air	  Gunner	  	  
106    Peter J. Usher
between pilots and air observers. These related on the one 
hand to the actual skills required, and on the other to air crew 
command structure in the RAF (and perforce in the BCATP), at 
the outset of the war. Air observers were seen as requiring mental 
skills, in particular the ability to calculate quickly, continuously, 
and accurately under duress. Pilots were seen as more action 
oriented, required to have more physical skills, hand-eye coor-
dination, “air sense,” and quickness of decision-making. In the 
early days of aviation, there was a not uncommon view in senior 
military circles that these pilot skills, along with courage and 
leadership, were the preserve of the white race if not indeed 
specifically of the Anglo-Saxon race.27 More importantly, the 
bomber aircraft was a combat unit, of which the pilot was the 
commander. He was the captain of his crew, even if he was not 
commissioned.28 In the extreme, the fate of his crew relied not 
only on his skills but also on his leadership and judgment. 
 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that Jews were 
stereotyped as smart or intellectual and thus well qualified to be 
navigators.29 Joe Jacobson wrote his friends, the day the selec-
tions were announced in his ITS course:
…to-day our fate was decided and we have been 
divided up for the duration of the war into gunners, 
observers and pilots. The ratio is as follows:
 observers  . . . 18% .  .  .  .  100
 pilots . . . . . . 35% .  .  .  .  200
 gunners.  .  .  .  .  46% .  .  .  .  250
Ace Jacobson is I am unhappy to announce an 
observer…We start from scratch again also we 
don’t do too much flying. We learn naviga-
tion, photography, gunnery & piloting but our 
position is still that of the master minds – we 
don’t get the real kick out of the thing that the 
pilots do. For once I was hoping to get a job 
where brains don’t count…However, a college 
grad. has no chance of becoming a pilot under 
present circumstances, but is compensated by  
being booked for the responsible jobs from the 
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beginning…Of the eight Jewish boys, only one 
is a gunner. (21 August 1940)30
Jacobson’s account cannot be the whole explanation, 
however. Likely more important was the traditional military 
conception of leadership, and in the kind of person the necessary 
qualities would most likely be found. What were characterized 
as “racial characteristics” (in the words of one of the medi-
cal board reports cited above) were still seen to be important. 
Isolated as the comment may have been, the view that both 
aviation and leadership were associated with the British “race” 
still had some currency. Although the output of men would 
soon outpace the production of aircraft, perhaps men of British 
ancestry were still seen as the best bets for pilot selection, while 
others could be directed to the other air trades. Such a view 
would have applied especially to Jews, given the not uncom-
mon stereotypes in military circles, but might also have applied 
to others of non-British ancestry.31 An examination of the fate 
of French Canadian or Ukrainian recruits might perhaps reveal 
a similar pattern. There were of course Jewish pilots,32 but the 
preponderance of Jews selected for training as air observers, in 
comparison to the general population, seems too striking to be 
mere coincidence.
 Patterns of commissioning and decoration followed 
from trade selection. In the outcome, one hundred and sixteen 
Jews were commissioned out of two hundred and eleven eligi-
ble air trade graduates (55%). Of the ninety-five NCOs, fifty 
seven were killed after 1942, a lower proportion of all deaths in 
the latter part of the war, which is consistent with the changes 
in commissioning policy at that time. As the initial eligibil-
ity for all trades combined upon graduation was well under a 
third, a significant number of these commissions must have 
been granted on the basis of later performance. In the absence 
of information on the overall proportion of air crew who were 
commissioned, there is no hard evidence to suggest that Jews 
failed to get their share of commissions (at least at the entry 
ranks of Pilot Officer and Flying Officer). 
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 It would be possible to determine the proportion of air 
crew who were commissioned by trade or religious affiliation 
or other recorded characteristic, although a very substantial 
research effort would be required to do so. However, there 
are a number of confounding factors that would make direct 
comparison among such groups difficult. These would include 
whether the commission was granted on the basis only of class 
standing or of later performance in operations, as well as when 
the commission was granted, in relation to policy changes over 
the course of the war. 
 Fifty Jewish Canadian airmen received the Distinguished 
Flying Cross (DFC) or Medal (DFM).33 Eighteen of these 
decorations were awarded to pilots, twenty-six to air observ-
ers, and three to other trades.34 This constituted 1.1% of the 
four thousand five hundred and seventy four DFCs and DFMs 
awarded to RCAF air crew during World War Two, or somewhat 
less than their proportion of air force personnel. No statistical 
significance can be attached to such numbers, and any direct 
comparison is fraught with confounding factors. Small as the 
discrepancy may be, it likely stems from trade selection, as 
pilots were the most likely to be awarded the DFC. It follows 
that as Jews were under-represented as pilots, they would have 
had lower odds of being decorated. 
 Overall, it may be concluded that Jewish volunteers had a 
substantial preference for Air Force service. They encountered 
no systemic barriers to entry, and they were appropriately recog-
nized over the course of the war for their skills, valour, and 
devotion to duty. They may in fact have found a more accepting 
environment in the Air Force than in the civilian life they left 
behind. If there was a glass ceiling that Jews were less able to 
penetrate in the Air Force during those years, it was as commander 
of an operational unit. Informally at least, within senior ranks, 
Jewish leadership potential appears to have been less recognized 
and, at least at the outset, perhaps even regarded as suspect. 
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Endnotes
1 According to the Canadian Jewish Congress, of a total of 8892 
Jewish service personnel in 1943, 4009 were in the RCAF (Gerald Tulchinsky, 
Branching Out: the Transformation of the Canadian Jewish Community, 
Toronto: Stoddart, 1998, 212). By war’s end, about 17,000 Jews had enlisted, 
according to Max Bookman, “Canadian Jews in Uniform,” in Eli Gottesman, 
ed. Canadian Jewish Reference Book and Directory (Ottawa: Jewish Institute 
of Higher Research, 1963), 111-128. In contrast, Jewish participation in the 
Army (especially its combat units) and in the Navy was, as Tulchinsky noted, 
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and (if known) place buried. Where the two sources conflict, I have chosen 
the information I consider the more accurate, which usually is from the 
second source. There are minor discrepancies of identification: a few indi-
viduals listed in one publication are not listed in the other. I have not yet 
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24 See English, op.cit.; and F. J. Hatch,  Aerodrome of Democracy: 
Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, 1939-45 (Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, 1983).
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particularly in Canada during training, rather than on their subsequent expe-
rience overseas. In the early years of the war, Canadians were posted to RAF 
units upon their arrival in Britain where, apart from pay and discipline, they 
were subject to the conditions of service and the culture of the RAF. From 
1942 onwards, they were posted mainly to RCAF squadrons in 6 Group, 
where different policies applied to commissioning.  
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